# Natives K:

## K - Speaking for Others:

### Notes:

Read this is the aff is prefiat and about natives but doesn’t have a narrative.

It’s dece and short. It’s a DA, not really a full K, but reading a narrative from a native person about NP would complete this and let you solve the case. I would just tag this as a reason to reject them, or some case turns

### 1N

#### The 1AC does not speak from the perspective of Native Americans --- it is just a speech talking vacuously about what we should do to them. Speaking for native voices silences them --- turns the case. ALCOFF:

The Problem of Speaking for Others Author(s): Linda Alcoff Source: Cultural Critique, No. 20 (Winter, 1991-1992), pp. 5-32

The recognition that there is a problem in speaking for others has arisen from two sources. First, there is a growing recognition that where one speaks from affects the meaning and truth of what one says, and thus that one cannot assume an ability to transcend one's location. In other words, a speaker's location (which I take here to refer to their social location, or social identity) has an epistemically significant impact on that speaker's claims and can serve either to authorize or disauthorize one's speech. The creation of women's studies and African-American studies departments was founded on this very belief: that both the study of and the advocacy for the oppressed must come to be done principally by the oppressed themselves, and that we must finally acknowledge that systematic divergences in social location between speakers and those spoken for will have a significant effect on the content of what is said. The unspoken premise here is simply that a speaker's location is epistemically salient. I shall explore this issue further in the next section. The second source involves a recognition that, not only is location epistemically salient, but certain privileged locations are discursively dangerous.4 In particular, the practice of privileged persons speaking for or on behalf of less privileged persons has actually resulted (in many cases) in increasing or reinforcing the oppression of the group spoken for. This was part of the argument made against Anne Cameron's speaking for Native Canadian women: Cameron's intentions were never in question, but the effects of her writing were argued to be counterproductive in regard to the needs of Native women. Thus, the work of privileged authors who speak on behalf of the oppressed is coming more and more under criticism from members of those oppressed groups themselves.5

#### Speaking for others a unique problem for natives – turns and magnifies all of your offense cause what you want to happen will be worse, Warner 99’

Warner, Sam L. "Kuleana: The right, responsibility, and authority of indigenous peoples to speak and make decisions for themselves in language and cultural revitalization." Anthropology & Education Quarterly 30.1 (1999): 68-93.

The notion of problems in speaking for others (i.e., speaking for indigenous and minority peoples) and issues of empowerment have become major issues in the literature today, particularly among academics and researchers from the dominant language and culture (Alcoff 1991; Cummins 1986; Ruiz 1990). In legitimizing and empowering their own identities and voices to speak for others, majority-language/ culture academics often obscure the identities and silence the very voices of the peoples for whom they claim to express concern. It is encouraging that minority academics and majority academics themselves are beginning to recognize this problem. A basic premise of this article is that the kuleam ("right, responsibility, and authority") to make decisions on things such as policy related to an indigenous or minority language and culture belongs to that indigenous or minority people from whom the language evolved. This position, which may strike some as essentialist in its critique of nonindigenous control over indigenous language revitalization, has evolved out of a long and complex history of struggle over land, sovereignty, and now culture. As Henze and Davis note in their introduction to this issue, anthropologists, both indigenous and nonindigenous, are beginning to reexamine what it means to reject the concept of race, and there are increasing numbers of voices cautioning that anthropology may have gone too far in disassociating ethnicity and culture. Examples of these voices can be heard in Harrison’s paper presented at the 1997 Presidential Panel of the American Anthropological Association, as well as in several editorials in the January 1998 issue of Anthropology Newsletter.

## K - “Indigenous People”:

### Notes

Read this against affs that fiat for the whole world’s natives and uses the term “indigenous people” to refer to everyone they effect. The cards are very good that it’s a bad category.

Probably needs some rehighlighting on that bottom card. Do that yourself.

### 1N – Short:

#### Applying the conception of “indigenous people” to worldwide groups is essentialist and problematic – it’s oppressive and will be interpreted in the worst ways we don’t want – oppression is instrumental to the category. BOWEN:

Should We Have a Universal Concept of 'Indigenous Peoples' Rights'?: Ethnicity and Essentialism in the Twenty-First Century Author(s): John R. Bowen Source: Anthropology Today, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Aug., 2000), pp. 12-16

In other parts of the world, the trope of indigenous/foreigners has been invoked to justify violence. Christopher Taylor (1999) points out that some Rwandan Hutus, in justifying their violence against Tutsi people, drew on narratives that depicted the Hutus as Rwanda's 'indigenous people' who had been conquered by Tutsis. In sim- ilar fashion, narratives that portray Muslims as 'conquerors' of the 'indigenous' Hindus are available to villagers in northern India, alongside alternative narra- tives, genealogical in form, that, in depicting shared kin- ship between present-day Muslims and Hindus, describe processes of conversion to Islam (Gottschalk 2000). The former narratives are, of course, those picked up and disseminated by Hindu nationalist activists, and they fit into an available international discourse of 'indigenous peo- ples'. As one legal scholar has commented (Kingsbury 1998:435): 'Once indigenousness or "sons of the soil" becomes the basis of legitimation for a politically or militarily dominant group, restraints on abuses of power can be difficult to maintain.' The trope of indigenous versus foreign has resonances in Europe as well, ones that we might wish to avoid. Bettina Arnold (1990) has traced the role of archaeology in supporting Nazi claims to be the autochthonous people of Europe. Nazi ideological requirements of racial purity did not allow a finding that Germans had migrated from somewhere else. Germans had to be indigenous people, or as nearly so as archaeology could make them by identifying a continuity of material assemblages over the territory then inhabited by Germans. (Nazis also claimed to be 'non-dominant' in the economic world.) Nazi claims may seem to have little to do with the cur- rent politics of identifying the indigenous peoples in former colonies, but the linking of legal and racial distinctions generally underlay European policy in those colonies. The French differentiated among indigenous and immigrant peoples within their colonies: in North Africa, for example, between authentic Arabs and their Mamluk or Ottoman oppressors (Amselle 1996). The legal regime for natives was called the indigenati so pejorative was the sense of this term and the cognate indigne that in current French discourse it has been replaced with the more neutral autochtone (Rouland et al. 1996: 428-29).

#### The alternative is to use locally specific meanings for specific groups rather than lumping them together – that’s the only way to solve the governance arguments in the aff. BOWEN 2

Should We Have a Universal Concept of 'Indigenous Peoples' Rights'?: Ethnicity and Essentialism in the Twenty-First Century Author(s): John R. Bowen Source: Anthropology Today, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Aug., 2000), pp. 12-16

I called this approach 'two-stage' because it first sets out general reasons for granting self-government rights to groups, and then argues that different types of group self- definition will appropriately arise in different regions. Within the general framework, groups formulate, demand, and have recognized their culturally specific and long-standing modes of relating to land and of governing themselves. These two elements - the special relations of people to land, and their long-term experience of self-government - are two central features of claims made in the name of indigenous people's rights. These claims take different forms in different regions and call for particular legal and political solutions. They are not necessarily based on an unbroken set of genealogical claims but on other, locally and historically specific ideas of resources, places, and claims, as in narratives about land use and movement presented by Australian Aboriginal peoples (Povinelli 1993). Indeed, it may be that the very effort to construct a universal legal idea of 'being indigenous', with its Western sense of unbroken genealogical descent, has made it more difficult to advance culturally distinct claims about people and place than would have been the case under a more flexible notion of self-determination.

#### Kritik is a prior question to the 1AC --- you do not know if their arguments are true absent reps. CRAWFORD:

[Neta Crawford, PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Political Science at Boston University, Argument and Change in World Politics, 2002, p. 19-21]

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately so much as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectively of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical import of representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

#### The kritik is not reliant on reps, rather this is just a weigh argument

### 1N – Medium:

#### Applying the conception of “indigenous people” to worldwide groups is essentialist and problematic – it doesn’t apply and leads to bad assumptions, Bowen 2k

Should We Have a Universal Concept of 'Indigenous Peoples' Rights'?: Ethnicity and Essentialism in the Twenty-First Century Author(s): John R. Bowen Source: Anthropology Today, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Aug., 2000), pp. 12-16

American 'tribes' and Aboriginal Australians have served as prototypes for thinking about 'indigenous peo- ples'. In the Americas, the long temporal gap between early migrations of today's First Peoples and the con- quest of the region by Europeans made the use of 'indigenous', although not precise (because everyone travelled to the Americas from somewhere else), at least capable of picking out a category of people who were the first to occupy the region. (I leave aside the more specific issues of tribal claims to grave sites on the basis of very longterm occupation.) The clear difference in modes of life and physical appearance between prototypical indigenous peoples and dominant populations, along with plausible assumptions that the former generally wished to preserve their distinctiveness, have made this conceptual framework broadly accepted, if not always easily applicable.6 This distinctiveness has also led to particular associations of indigenousness with cultural authenticity, spiritual ties to the land, powerful medicinal knowledge, and in Brazil, in the form of 'indigenism', a powerful set of public images about national identity (Ramos 1998). In Asia and Africa, by contrast, no such long time gap exists between an initial peopling and a subsequent conquest. Populations moved around and some absorbed others; these differences in demographic history have led a number of Asian and African scholars and delegates to international forums to argue that the category 'indigenous peoples' should be limited to the Americas and Australia (Rouland et al. 1996: 427-79; Waehle 1991). International agencies have responded by identifying as 'indigenous peoples' those groups seen as distinct and vulnerable (usually nomadic or pastoral in mode of life), groups labeled locally as 'tribes' (especially in India), or groups in rebellion against the state. (Thus, the East Timorese appeared frequently on lists of 'indigenous peoples', but not the West Timorese, who had not coalesced into a group opposing the Indonesian state.) In some cases the idea of 'non-dominance' becomes the primary criterion (Kingsbury 1998:453), leading one to wonder whether a reversal in political fortunes could create newly 'indigenous' peoples out of formerly dominant ones. Consider the strenuous conceptual stretching under- taken by the editors of a recent book on Asia to apply the concept of 'indigenous peoples' to that continent, a task which one of the book's editors declared to be 'extremely difficult but by no means impossible' (Gray 1995:37). One author (Kingsbury 1995:29-33) notes that China and Indonesia have plausibly claimed that all their people have lived on their lands for a long time, and hence are equally 'indigenous'. In the way of a solution to the problem he proposes that we should no longer require that 'indigenous people' have had a historical continuity with the land - thus abandoning precisely the original argument that indigenous peoples were different from other oppressed minorities.7 In the same volume, writing about eastern Indonesia, a region of precisely those small-scale, economically and politically vulnerable societies generally intended to benefit from being labelled 'indigenous', the anthropologist Robert Barnes (1993:322), who prefers to retain some idea of prior occupation for the concept of 'indigenous', states that one simply cannot distinguish between indigenous and other peoples in eastern Indonesia.8 As if in revenge for his agnosticism, it is the society where Barnes did much of his fieldwork, the K?dang, which, alone of all eastern Indonesian societies, appears on a U.N. website map of 'indigenous peoples' !9 As an illustration of this haphazard process of labelling societies, let me mention the province where I do most of my own fieldwork, Aceh, on the northwestern tip of Sumatra. The Acehnese Liberation Front claims that Aceh was colonized by the Javanese after having been colonized by the Dutch, never joined Indonesia, and should now revert to control by the Acehnese bangsa (people, nation), an idea that deeply troubles the ethnic minorities within Aceh, whose situation is ignored in the press. News stories about the Acehnese routinely speak of them as an indigenous people. And yet the Acehnese have never thought of themselves as 'indigenous'; the folk etymology of Aceh is 'Arab, Cina, Eropa, Hindi', to indicate that the area has been a land of immigration of people from many corners of the world, whose common element is Islam. Most Acehnese were also enthusiastic participants in the Indonesian Revolution; their major complaints concern Jakarta's appropriation of their oil and gas resources and brutal military occupation of the province.

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